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Former officials in business are often blamed for abusing their connections to the 
government to distort public policy to their advantage. This paper examines the extent of 
rents to former officials by analyzing subsidy allocation among state-owned enterprises in 
Korea. Defining connected CEOs as former members of the National Assembly or 
government officials, I have estimated the effects of connected CEOs on attracting 
government subsidies. Substantial replacement of CEOs after the change of political 
leadership, a unique feature of state-owned enterprises of Korea, helps cleaner identification 
than other related studies relying only on cross-sectional variations. The empirical evidence 
is consistent with a hypothesis that connected CEOs are more likely than others to attract 
state subsidy. This relationship seems stronger in case of CEOs from the relevant offices and 
weaker when the competing recipients have strong connections. Given the data limitation, 
however, part of the estimated effects may come from expertise rather than connections 
especially for former bureaucrats. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption and rent-seeking are widespread in the world, and there is a growing 
consensus that they incur considerable economic costs (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; 
Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Hwang, 2002). This paper explores a particular example 
of rent-seeking: rent-seeking by former officials in the state-owned enterprises. 
Legislators and bureaucrats often seek jobs in business after retiring from public 
 
* This paper is an extensive revision and expansion of the earlier working paper, Min(2008). The working 
paper version was presented in the 2007 annual conference of the Korean Association of Public Finance. I am 
indebted to an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions but retain responsibility for any 
remaining errors. This research was financially supported by Hansung University.
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offices or during an interval between positions. In some cases, retiring officials are 
legally prevented for a certain period from taking jobs in the industries affected by their 
legislation and regulation. None the less, former officials in business are very common 
even in developed countries and often a subject of significant debate. In the English 
speaking world, “revolving door” means the movement of personnel between positions 
as legislators and regulator and the relevant industries. The close nexus between the 
government and business may allow them to reciprocate privileges to the detriment of 
the society. Although the economic theory predicts such rent-seeking behavior by 
former officials (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), the empirical evidence remains largely 
limited and anecdotal.   
This paper examines the extent of rents to former officials and the mechanism 
through which rent provision occurs, using the detailed data on state-owned enterprises 
of Korea from 2001 to 2005. Defining connected CEOs as former members of the 
National Assembly or government officials, I estimated the effects of connected CEOs 
on attracting government subsidies. The empirical evidence is consistent with a 
hypothesis that connected CEOs are more likely than others to attract state subsidy. This 
relationship seems stronger in case of CEOs from the relevant offices and weaker when 
the competing recipients have strong connections. These findings show a specific 
manner in which rents are provided to former officials.   
This paper adds to the small but growing literature that examines the role of 
politicians and bureaucrats in business (Bertrand et al., 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Cohen, 1986; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005; Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001). The evidence 
from Korea is unique in the following senses. First, the data from Korean state-owned 
enterprises exhibit wider within-firm variations in connection variables than usual 
private firms. Due to the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, the change of 
political leadership often results in substantial replacement of CEOs. Using changes in 
connection variables before and after the Presidential election, I estimate an empirical 
model controlling for firm fixed effects. It allows for cleaner identification of the 
connection effects than previous studies. Secondly, detailed information on CEOs is 
available on the Korean state enterprise, which allows the researcher to measure not just 
the presence of connections but also the strength. It makes possible a richer analysis on 
rents to former officials than in the other papers. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional environment. 
Section 3 describes the data set and section 4 provides the main results and some 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.    STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES OF KOREA 
 
As of year 2005, the state-owned enterprise sector of Korea consisted of a total of 26 
firms employing 85,000 workers, owned 214 trillion won (211 billion in US dollar) of 
total assets, and produced 15 trillion won (15 billion in US dollar) of value-added, FORMER OFFICIALS AND SUBSIDIES TO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES  3
contributing 2% of GDP. Its importance in the national economy, however, is more than 
the number suggests, for they are often monopolistic suppliers in key industries, such as 
energy, transportation, housing and banking. 
CEO appointment has been the subject of much debate, and sometimes that of 
political scandal. Because the Act on the Management of Public Institutions empowers 
the President to appoint CEOs of state-owned enterprises, the winner of a Presidential 
election is often alleged to place politicians in the board of state-owned enterprises as a 
reward for their support during the election campaign.
1 It is also very common that 
government officials retire and move to the executives of the state-owned enterprises. 
Politician CEOs or former-bureaucrat CEOs of state-owned enterprises are often called 
parachute for obvious reasons.
2  One interesting fact is that many CEOs do not complete 
their statutory term of 3 years. According to Choi (2003), only 41% of CEOs finish their 
tenure. 
Each state-owned enterprise is affiliated with a supervising ministry in the 
government. For example, Korea Electric Power Corporation falls under the jurisdiction 
of Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. According to the Act on the 
Management of Public Institutions, state-owned enterprises are required to submit 
management plans and performance reports to the supervising ministries, and ministers 
have the authority to supervise the affiliated state-owned enterprises.   
The legal authority to allocate subsidies lies in ministers following the Act of the 
Budgeting and Management Subsidies, but the President appoints ministers and the 
National Assembly approves the ministry’s budget. CEOs of the state-owned enterprises 
may influence the ministry’s subsidy allocation through various channels. It is also 
possible that former National Assembly members’ connections work differently from 
former bureaucrats’. Former National Assembly members may influence the ministry’s 
decision through connections to the National Assembly (or relevant committee), or to 
the other politicians in the administration. On the other hand, bureaucrats may be 
connected to the ministers or the other staff members. Even though connections may 
take different forms, they all can be called favoritism, meaning the action of offering 
contracts and resources to members of one’s own social group to the detriment of others 






1 Numerous newspaper articles documented political appointment of CEOs in state-owned enterprises. 
See MK Business News (19 March, 2001), Dong-A daily (11 April, 2003), Kookmin Ilbo (23 June, 2005) for 
example. 
2 Public officials in Japan often move to private or public firms. Such practice is called Amakudari in 
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3.  DATA 
 
The financial statements of state-owned enterprises are available from the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance. CEO data come mainly from the Dong-A biographical 
dictionary, but I also consult the National Assembly Information System for committee 
membership. I find 66 CEOs in the Dong-A biographical dictionary and merge with the 
firm data, and yet not all 26 state-owned enterprises can be matched to the 
corresponding CEOs. The final sample includes 22 firms from year 2001 to 2005, 
consisting of 81 firm-year pairs. The relatively small sample size limits the scope for 
more disaggregated analysis, but the sample covers most of the whole population of 
Korean state-owned enterprises.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics of key variables. As only a part of the sample 
enterprises receive non-zero subsidies, I added a separate summary for the sub-sample. 
Notice that firms in the sample vary much in size. The average asset size is 84 billion 
won while the standard deviation reaches 138 billion won. The largest firm has a 
thousand times more assets than the smallest. Given the substantial difference in firm 
size, subsidies are normalized by assets to facilitate comparison across firms. The 
subsidy to asset ratio also varies much from 0% to 12%. The other notable feature is that 
only 29.6% of the sample has positive subsidy and the others receive none at all. When 
restricted to the non-zero subsidy sub-sample, the average subsidy amount is 400 million 
won and the average subsidy to asset ratio is 4%. Firms in the sub-sample are on average 
smaller than in the whole sample, meaning that government subsidies tend to be directed 
to smaller firms. 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary  Statistics 
 
Whole Sample  Sub-sample with Non-zero Subsidy 
mean  std dev min max  mean std dev min  max 
subsidy(billion won)  0.12  0.23 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.26 0.03 1.00 
assets(billion won)  84.00  138.30 0.60 616.3 47.30 67.50 4.10  307.5
subsidy/assets 0.01  0.03 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.12 
no. of observations  81  24 
 
  
Connection variables are based on the CEOs’ employment history. NA is a dummy 
variable defined to be one if the CEO was a National Assembly member before joining 
the firm, and zero otherwise. Similarly, BUR is a dummy variable for a bureaucrat in the 
central government. In order to characterize differential degrees of connections, the 
following variables are defined. rel_NA  is a dummy variable for a member of the 
relevant standing committee in the National Assembly. A relevant committee means that 
the committee’s jurisdiction includes the state-owned enterprise and its supervising FORMER OFFICIALS AND SUBSIDIES TO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES  5
ministry.  unrel_NA  is a dummy variable for a member of the National Assembly 
standing committee unrelated to his or her firm, and zero otherwise. Similarly, rel_BUR 
is a dummy variable for a bureaucrat from a supervising ministry while unrel_BUR is 
for a bureaucrat from the other ministries.
3 Appendix lists supervising ministries in the 
government, and relevant standing committees in the National Assembly for state-owned 




Figure 1.    CEO Characteristics Variables 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the trends in connection variables. Notice that a new President of 
Korea was inaugurated in year 2003, around which substantial changes occurred in the 
characteristics of CEOs of state-owned enterprises. The unique institutional environment 
explains considerable replacement of CEOs after the change in political leadership. 
Figure 1 also shows a notable change in connection variables around 2003. The share of 
the bureaucrats from supervising ministries (rel_BUR) rose but the share of the 
bureaucrats from unrelated ministries (unrel_BUR) dropped. The change seems less 
 
3 If CEOs change in the middle of a year, I take the average of CEOs characteristics weighted by their 
term in the year. To illustrate the definitions with an example, a new CEO of Korea Gas was appointed in 
September 2003. The outgoing CEO used to be a member of Commerce, Industry and Energy committee in 
the National Assembly, and the new CEO was an assistant deputy minister of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy. As the ministry and the committee are related to the firm, NA=2/3,  rel_NA=2/3,  unrel_NA=0, 
BUR=1/3, rel_BUR=1/3, unrel_BUR=0 for Korea Gas in year 2003.   
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dramatic with the share of the National Assembly members but both rel_NA  and 
unrel_NA became clearly lower in the new administration. The trend in Figure 1 is 
unique of the sample in this study. It allows the researcher to identify a model using 
within-firm variation in connection variables. Although not all CEOs finish their 
statutory tenure, it is not politically sensible that the new president change all CEOs of 
the state-owned enterprises at the same time. Thus, the composition of CEO 
characteristics changes even in 2004 and 2005. 
 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how much the connected 
CEOs attract government subsidy while controlling for profitability, size and other firm 
characteristics that may affect the subsidy provision. I consider an estimation equation 
similar to Bertrand et al. (2006). For firm i in year t, the subsidy to asset ratio y is 
assumed to take the following form, 
 
it i t it it it Z X y           ,                                         ( 1 )  
 
where X is a set of CEO connection variables (NA, rel_NA, unrel_NA, BUR, rel_BUR, 
unrel_BUR), Z is a set of other firm characteristics including firm size and profitability, 
δ’s are year-specific constants, and ξ captures unobserved heterogeneity across firms. 
Time-invariant firm characteristics such as establishment year, industry to which a firm 
belongs, and a supervising ministry are thought to be absorbed into ξ. Estimating β is of 
primary interest in this study. Note that Equation (1) is in a linear form although the 
dependent variable takes zero for a group of observations. The reason is that the model 
can control for unobserved firm heterogeneity in a more robust way than a nonlinear 
specification such as a Tobit model. For the purpose of comparison, I also report the 
Tobit regressions results in the end.   
Table 2 reports the estimation results. Column 1 runs a pooled OLS without firm 
fixed effects. Return on assets has a coefficient estimate of -0.116 and it is statistically 
significant at 1%. Firms with poor financial performance tend to receive subsidies. 
Subsidizing financially challenged firms is typical of state ownership and is often cited 
as a source of inefficiency in its own. But in this paper, I do not examine the implication 
but use financial performance mainly as a control variable to separate out the effects of 
connections.  
Column 2 estimates a model with firm fixed effects included. The coefficient of NA 
is 0.007 and that of BUR is 0.008. Both coefficients are estimated precisely and are 
statistically different from zero at usual significance levels. Given the relatively small 
sample size, considerable within-firm variation in connections helps precise estimation 
in a fixed effects model. Also, note that the coefficients of NA  and  BUR changed 
significantly from column 2. OLS without firm fixed effects would lead to wrong FORMER OFFICIALS AND SUBSIDIES TO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES  7
estimates as long as connection variables are correlated with unobserved firm 
characteristics. The estimated coefficients of NA and BUR imply connected CEOs attract 
more subsidies. It would measure the degree to which connections distort subsidy 
allocation as long as the control variables reasonably capture a firm’s need for the 
subsidies. The estimated effects are similar in magnitude whether the CEO was a 
National Assembly member or a bureaucrat. A former National Assembly member 
would bring more subsidies than unconnected CEOs by 0.7% of total assets. Similarly, a 
former bureaucrat tends to draw more subsidies than unconnected CEOs by 0.8% of the 
firm’s assets. 
Two points are worth noting on column 2. First, financial performance is not 
statistically significant as opposed to OLS without fixed effects. As financial 
performance exhibits persistence and does not vary much over time, its effect is hard to 
separate from firm fixed effects. Therefore, the result in column 2 is not inconsistent 
with the government subsidizing poorly performing enterprises. Secondly, the estimated 
effect of connections is 0.7~0.8% of total assets, which amounts to 600 million won 
(650 thousand in US dollars) for an average-sized firm in the sample. Though 
statistically significant, it seems modest in an economic sense. A possible reason is that 
state subsidy is only one way of granting favor and the other forms may be in action at 
the same time: such as preferential access to capital, granting monopoly status, etc.   
In column 3, the right hand side variables measure different degrees of connections. 
rel_NA  is statistically significant but unrel_NA  is not. The connection effect is 
significant only when the National Assembly member was from the relevant standing 
committee. Similarly, the effect is larger for rel_BUR than unrel_BUR even though both 
are statistically significant. CEOs from the related committee or from the supervising 
ministry would have stronger connections to the current policy makers than the other 
legislators or bureaucrats. The result in column 3 shows that stronger connections lead to 
stronger effects on subsidies. 
Interpreting the result in column 3, some would argue that former officials from the 
relevant offices are likely to have better expertise and therefore take advantage of the 
expertise to attract more subsidies from the government. That is, column 3 does not 
distinguish connection from expertise. In order to address the issue, I run a regression 
that distinguishes the CEOs appointed in the current administration (cur_NA  and 
cur_BUR) from the ones appointed in the previous administration (prev_NA  and 
prev_BUR). As long as CEO expertise does not depreciate very fast, differential effects 
between two groups may be interpreted mostly coming from connections. Column 4 
reports the estimation result. For former National Assembly members, CEOs appointed 
in the current administration receives higher subsidies than CEOs appointed in the 
previous administration. The coefficient of cur_NA is 0.008 and significant at 5%, but 
the coefficient of prev_NA is statistically insignificant. However, no statistical difference 
is found among bureaucrat CEOs. Both coefficients of cur_BUR and prev_BUR are 
0.007 and statistically significant. Thus, column 4 presents partial evidence that 
connections do matter but the result is not robust across types of CEOs. It is possible that HEECHUL MIN  8
bureaucrats’ connections and expertise depreciate differently from politicians’. However, 
the current data does not allow further detailed analysis. Therefore, the result in this 
paper needs to be interpreted with caution. Part of the estimated effects may come from 
expertise rather than connections, especially for former bureaucrats. 
 
 
Table 2.    Linear Regression Result 
 1  2  3  4  5 
NA  0.034** 0.007** 0.009*** 
  (0.014)  (0.003) (0.003) 
rel_NA   0.011***  
    (0.004)  
unrel_NA   0.004   
   (0.004)   
cur_NA   0.008**  
   (0.003)   
prev_NA   0.004   
   (0.006)   
other_NA   -0.019*** 
   (0.007) 
BUR  -0.009 0.008*** 0.007*** 
  (0.008) (0.002)      (0.002) 
rel_BUR   0.009***  
   (0.003)   
unrel_BUR   0.007***  
   (0.003)   
cur_BUR   0.007***  
   (0.003)   
prev_BUR   0.007***  
   (0.003)   
other_BUR   0.002 
   (0.003) 
roa(t-1)  -0.116*** 0.000  0.002  -0.000  0.005 
  (0.030) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Log(assets)  -0.005*** -0.001  -0.003  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Year dummies  included  included included  included  included 
Firm fixed effects not included  included  included  included  included 
N 81  81  81  81  81 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. FORMER OFFICIALS AND SUBSIDIES TO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES  9
Column 5 adds variables on the other enterprises. other_NA is the average of NA 
among the other firms under the same supervising ministry. other_BUR is similarly 
defined. If state-owned enterprises under the same supervising ministry compete for a 
common pool of subsidies, the other firms’ connections also change the chance of 
receiving subsidies. It is a reasonable prediction because the law empowers the ministers 
to grant subsidies among the enterprises under his or her supervision as explained in 
section 2. The coefficient of other_NA is -0.019, statistically significant and even larger 
than the coefficient of NA in absolute values. The result supports the previous prediction 
but no significant effect is found for other_BUR. It may be because the connection 
through former legislators works differently from the one through former bureaucrats 
but the reason is not clear with the current data. The differential aspects of the two forms 
of network would be an interesting area for future research. 
The results in Table 2 can be summarized as follows. Former legislators or 
bureaucrats attract more subsidies than the other CEOs. The effect is more evident when 
the CEO was from the relevant standing committee or the supervising ministry, and the 
effect becomes weaker when the other recipients of subsidies have strong connections. 
These are consistent with a hypothesis that former legislators and bureaucrats can distort 
subsidy allocation through their connections to a policy maker. However, appropriate 
caution is advised in interpreting the result because part of the estimated effects of 
connections may come from expertise. 
In the following, I check the robustness of the main findings in a couple of ways. 
Since not all firms receive non-zero subsidy, it is worth checking whether the result is 
robust in a model that allows the dependent variable to be truncated. I have estimated an 
unobserved effects Tobit model following Wooldridge (2002) and reports the estimates 
in column 1 in Table 3. Both NA  and  BUR have significantly positive coefficients. 
Although the estimates cannot be directly compared across models, it has the same 
qualitative implications as the linear regression. To facilitate interpretation, I calculated 
two sets of partial effects using the estimated Tobit model. One is the partial effects on 
the dependent variable conditional on positive subsidy ( dx dy/  given  0  y ), and the 
other is the partial effects on the probability of positive subsidy ( dx y d / ) 0 Pr(  ). The 
estimated partial effects for each right hand side variable are listed in column 2 and 3. 
The former National Assembly member would increase the firm’s subsidy to asset ratio 
by 0.3% conditional on positive subsidy, and would increase the probability of receiving 
subsidy by 5.5%. Similarly, the former bureaucrats raise the subsidy to asset ratio by 
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   Table  3.    Tobit Regression Result 
 
1 2 3 
coefficients  dx dy/  given  0  y dx y d / ) 0 Pr(   
NA  0.013** 0.003** 0.055** 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.026) 
BUR 
0.014*** 0.004*** 0.060*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.022) 
roa(t-1) 
-0.014 -0.003 -0.059 
(0.024) (0.006) (0.099) 
Log(assets) 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.015) 
Year dummies  included
N 81   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
 
 
The next robustness check involves alternative dependent variables. In Table 4, I 
report regressions with the subsidy to sales ratio and the subsidy to equity ratio as 
dependent variables respectively. Those regressions are not presented as the main 
findings because state-owned enterprises may take unusual values of sales and equity. 
State-owned enterprises are often required to provide non-marketable goods and services, 
and are sometimes under price regulation. Then, sales volume is only a poor measure of 
firm size. Equity can also be flawed because some state-owned enterprises such as 
Korea Coal Corporation continue to make loss even to impair capital. However, the 
regressions with alternative dependent variables are suggestive of the robustness of the 
main findings. Table 4 reports the results. With the subsidy to sales ratio, NA  is 
significant and BUR is not. But BUR has a p-value of 0.104 barely short of 10% 
significance. With the subsidy to equity ratio as a dependent variable, BUR is marginally 
significant but NA is not. Note that firms with negative equity are dropped for the second 
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Table 4.  Alternative  Dependent  Variables 
 
1 2 
dep. Var.: subsidy/sales  dep. var.: subsidy/equity 











Year dummies  included included 
Firm fixed effects  included  included 
N 81  76 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines present evidence of rents to former officials and offers a 
specific manner in which rents are provided, adding to the growing literature on 
politicians and bureaucrats in business. Using the detailed data on state-owned 
enterprises of Korea, I show that CEOs who were legislators or bureaucrats are 
associated with more government subsidies than unconnected ones. The relationship 
seems stronger in case of CEOs from the relevant standing committee or the supervising 
ministry. But the effect becomes weaker when the competing recipients have strong 
connections. The results are robust with alternative functional forms and scale variables. 
The result, however, need be interpreted with caution because part of the estimated 
effects may come from expertise rather than connections, especially for former 
bureaucrats. 
Some policy issues flow from the main findings. This paper casts reasonable doubts 
on the practice of appointing former officials to CEOs of state-owned enterprises. If 
granting subsidy is not the only form of rents and if policy makers have a wide range of 
discretion, the adverse effects to resource allocation may be more serious. Of course, the 
nexus between the government and former officials may arguably help enhancing 
efficiency in some areas of work under the institutional surroundings of state-owned 
enterprises. However, no concrete evidence of gains has been presented in the literature. 
The implications of this paper may extend to former officials in private business. The 
issue is especially relevant to highly regulated industries such as finance and public 
utilities as long as the network between policy makers and former officials is concerned. 
There remain some issues for further study. First, granting subsidies is only one HEECHUL MIN  12
method of giving favor to firms. Investigating alternative forms including preferential 
access to capital and monopoly status would be an important research topic. Secondly, 
this paper has found that Assembly members are not very different from public officials 
as far as their effects on subsidies are concerned. In fact, politicians and bureaucrats may 
differ in networks, means of influence, and incentives. It is interesting to identify their 
differential effects. Thirdly, it is a challenging task to precisely separate connections 
from expertise since both variables are measured based on past experience. More 
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